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Abstract 
Since the l980s, many developing countries have been adjusting to 
severe macro economlc imbalances. There has been a concern that 
the accompanying changes in fiscal policy may be having a 
detrimental effect on the health status of these populations. To 
examine the relationships between changes in fiscal policy and 
health, a "social matrix" is developed which captures hmv the 
equity structure of the fiscal system can influence the 
efficiency with which health-related inputs are combined. It is 
the principal conclusion of this paper that hous.ehold responses 
to changes in public policy can best be elucidated for a given 
society when the "social matrix" underlying the structure of the 
fiscal system is adequately specified. In contrast to other 
studies which look at poverty or vulnerability in general, this 
approach draws attentions to those \vho .are fiscally vulnerable, 
that is, those who are dependent on public subsidies and as a 
result experience a fall in living standards (full income) when 
these subsidies are removed. 
The Role of Government Policy for Health: 
Equity versus Efficiency or Poverty versus Fiscal Vulnerability 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Many countries starting from the late 1970's had to adjust 
to severe macro economic imbalances. These circumstances and 
adjustments created a concern as to their impact on past and 
future gains in health status in developing countries. For 
example, in the late 1980's UNICEF suggested that the erosion of 
public commitment to social programs could have dire consequences 
to the health of the poor and vulnerable segments of society 
(Cornia, Jolly and ste1vart, 1987). They recommended a balanced 
approach with a "human face." The World Bank 1vas equally 
concerned, especially 1vith the financial viability of the public 
health system (World Bank, 1987). In 1987, it proposed an 
innovative "Agenda for Reform" that recommended a shift in the 
responsibility of health care finance towards the private sector, 
l·lhile attempting to maintain an acceptable compromise between 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness. A major concern was how 
shifts in the provision and financing of health-related services 
from the public to the private sector would affect health status. 
In this paper, we focus on the public sector and how changes in 
the distribution of public subsidies for health services may 
affect health status. 
The question of how public support for health care finance 
will be replaced, and by whom, as government withdraws its 
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commitments should consider how the overall pattern of government 
subsidies in health and health-related activities influence 
household demand for health and accordingly health services 
utilization. The household production of health depends on the 
efficient combination of the proximate determinants to health 
within the household budget. Government policy affects the 
availability and distribution of the proximate determinants 
necessary for the production of health. This means that the 
equity structure of the fiscal system can influence the 
efficiency with which health-related inputs are combined. The 
linkages betlveen equity and efficiency as they pertain to health 
promotion create what we term the "social matrix" for a given 
society. It is the principal conclusion of this paper that 
household responses to changes in public policy can best be 
elucidated for a given society when the "social matrix" 
underlying the structure of the fiscal system is adequately 
specified. Within the fiscal system, we attempt to differentiate 
the forces that influence the efficiency in health production 
from those implying equity considerations. To date, there has 
been little systematic analysis of the efficiency versus 
distributional motives for various macro policies in health 
(Behrman and Deolalikar, l988). 
The social matrix highlights a particular aspect of equity, 
namely, "fiscal vulnerability". The fiscally vulnerable are 
those who experience a fall in living standards {full income) as 
a result of a secular decrease in public expenditure. Other 
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studies I·Thich examine the impact of structural adjustment 
programs on income distribution focus on the poor, as defined by 
traditional indicators of poverty (money-metric poverty line 
measures), income distribution (Gini coefficients), primary 
incomes and wages (Bourguignon, de Melo, Morrisson, 1991i 
Bourguignon, de !1elo, Suwa, 1991{ Lambert, Schneider, suwa, 1991j 
Sahn, 1990). In some cases, the terms "poverty" and 
"vulnerability" are used interchangeably (Jolly, 1985). In this 
discussion, 1·1e do not attempt to deal with all vulnerable groups i 
rather, we are concerned with those households whose living 
standards are threatened by changes in fiscal policy. 
We develop the concept of the social matrix by starting vrith 
a discussion of its foundation in previous literature. Next, we 
present the conceptual framework underlying the social matrix. 
Third, we apply the framelvork by reviewing existing evidence from 
two empirical studies of the Ivory Coast and the Sudan in terms 
of the social matrix. Finally, vre conclude lvith a discussion of 
the implication of the social matrix for future research design 
and policy analysis. The fiscal system affects both income 
(earned and unearned) and prices. The primary objective of the 
social matrix is to trace these price and income effects to 
assess the impact of fiscal policy on health promotion. Improved 
data collection and analysis of real income effects is essential. 
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2.0 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
This social matrix builds on four major issues identified in 
the previous literature. First, in addressing the impact of 
stabilization and adjustments on income distribution, most 
studies have taken as their starting point the onset of the 
crisis and the initiating of policy measures to restore macro-
economic balance; they use counterfactual analysis, a comparison 
of the economy's actual path with that which it would have taken 
under different policies (Bourguignon, de Melo, Morrisson, 1991; 
Bourguignon, de Melo, suwa, 1991; Scobie, 1989; Sarris, 1990). 
Not much attention has been paid to changes in income 
distribution and in associated patterns of household resource 
allocation that accompanied the pre-adjustment policies that lead 
to the crisis. Rather, concern for how the country arrived at 
its present state has focused primarily on whether the 
macroeconomic imbalances are perceived as temporary or permanent. 
It is our view that such lack of attention to the preexisting 
relationships of fiscal policy and income distribution could 
significantly affect understanding the impact. 
Second, studies have shown that the question of health 
statusjhealth service utilization response to income and prices 
may not be adequately estimated because of methodological 
problems of estimating income elasticities which arise when 
persons or goods are aggregated (Alderman, 1990; Bouis and 
Haddad, 1988). Later studies which disaggregate across persons 
and goods find smaller income effects (Behrman and Deolalikar, 
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1987i Strauss and Thomas, 1989i Bhargava, 1991). These more 
recent studies took as a point of departure the income impact on 
nutrient intake in a relative sense, i.e., "the impacts on the 
adequacy of these intakes relative to needs" (Ravallion, 1991) . 
We take it as a point of departure in the present analysis that 
it is also the insensitivity of the income being measured in most 
surveys and studies to the contribution of public policies to 
families' full income (i.e. that includes the value of public and 
private income and price subsidies received by the household) 
that may cause significant unkno~m biases in estimating the 
impact of change in public policies in general and structural 
adjustment in particular on the health status and health service 
utilization of families and individuals. 
Third, our analysis sheds light on the issues of 
substitution. It has been argued that as income declines, 
households undertake a process of resource reallocation leading 
to the substitution of inefficient health and health-related 
inputs to more efficient ones (Behrman, 1988ai Scobie, 1989) . In 
one sense, the harshness of the adjustment process may be 
desirable. It may have a net welfare benefit in terms of 
reducing inefficiency in household health-related activities. 
This hypothesis, although comforting as a rationalization of a 
given policy, lacks adequate conceptual and empirical foundation. 
On the conceptual level there are two groups of poor people: 
those who are poor independent of government policies and those 
who are poor as a result of change in government policies. The 
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first group should have their substitution effect already in 
place. But do they? The second group needs careful 
identification based on the distribution of benefits and 
accordingly, a pre-post policy analysis. Furthermore, the 
presence of alternative options becomes a key factor that needs 
examining (Alderman and Gertler, l989}. More fundamental, if 
according to some findings, health status did not deteriorate 
significantly during the period of adjustment, the reason may be 
partly a more efficient reallocation of resources within the 
household, partly a result of a changing pattern of income 
distribution, but it could also have implications for the 
efficiency of public programs. 
Fourth, our analysis focuses on what we label the social 
matrix of society in order to evaluate pre- and post-changes in 
government policies. It provides a richer mode of analysis that 
gives quantitative and qualitative assessment. It provides a 
more solid foundation for clarifying the important distinction 
between the poor and the vulnerable. 
3.0 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
(a) Background 
In this section, the relationships between public policies 
and health are developed more fully using an economic model of 
individual behavior. structural adjustment policies are complex; 
discussing all adjustment policies is not feasible in a single 
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study, so 1ve focus on instruments aimed at restricting real 
income and components that curtail public health expenditures. 
Ultimately, most structural policies affect households by 
altering the level and composition of their full income (Behrman, 
1988b) . To elucidate household responses to changes in public 
policy, therefore, an underlying-classification of households by 
potential full income effects of structural adjustment is useful, 
where the classification highlights the linkages between full 
income and health. 
Most previous studies implicitly or explicitly assume that 
government policies are designed to improve the full incomes of 
the poor. Following this assumption, most studies of the equity 
implications of structural adjustment have focused on the poor. 
In reality, substantial evidence exists to the contrary, namely, 
that many public programs often do not reach the poor 
(Bourguignon, de Melo, Morrisson; 1991). If public policy 
reaches groups other than the poor, then one must reassess lvho 
are the vulnerable when public policy is adjusted, that is, who 
faces welfare losses as full incomes change. This leads us to 
define "fiscal vulnerability". The fiscally vulnerable are those 
who experience a fall in full income as a result of a secular 
decrease in public expenditure. 
Determining fiscal vulnerability to structural adjustment 
programs depends critically on the degree to which households are 
integrated into formal markets (Sahn, 1990; Behrman, 1988b). In 
particular, we classify households by whether or not they have 
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access to any one of four major government policies affecting 
full income: (1) households living in communities vlhere public 
expenditures are allocated to ameliorate community environmental 
conditions; (2) households with access to subsidized prices, 
primarily of health-related goods; (3) households with access to 
subsidized family unearned income; and (4) households with access 
to subsidies for family earned income. Government policies 
affect health especially through prices, primarily for health-
related inputs, community endowments and income transfers. 
For example the effects of adjustment on curative services -
on the availability of medical supplies, on expansion of 
services, on quality of care, on higher user fees, and on costs 
as a result of higher import prices - are likely to have a 
negative effect on health (Diop, Hill, Sirageldin; 1991 and 
sirageldin and Diop, 1991). This effect will be most marked for 
those who, in earlier periods, used the services most 
intensively. The urban population, perhaps most of all the urban 
middle class, may thus be affected1 • 
The contrast betlveen fiscal vulnerability, general 
vulnerability, and poverty can also be seen in discussions of the 
political sustainability of structural adjustment packages 
(Bourguignon, de Melo, Morrisson; 1991). Stabilization and 
adjustment measures may fail because they do not take into 
account the resistance of those whose standard of living will 
fall as a result of the measures, often the urban middle class or 
civil servants. 
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(b) The Model 
In this model, \ve conceptualize the health of an individual 
as a durable good, referred to as the stock of health. This has 
a desirable level \•lhich can be maintained by a variety of inputs. 
The stock of health is the individual's capacity to combat 
disease. This treatment follo1vs ·a, growing tradition in economics 
(Cropper ~977; Grossman ~972; Muurinen and LeGrand ~985). The 
level of child health that the family can attain is constrained 
by the family's financial and non-financial resources and its 
economic environment. 
It \•Till be assumed that health has value or utility (U) in 
itself because it augments the welfare of an individual's family. 
This is shO\vn in equation (~). Health stock (H) results in 
healthy days (h) as sh01m in equation (2). 
(~) v = SoT a(t) U[C(t), h(t) J dt; u,, uh > o; 







time discounted utility 
utility derived from health days and 
consumption at time t 
composite consumption good 
time discount function 
healthy days produced from health stock of an 
individual born at time 0 
Health stock at time t 
A household member is assumed to be innately endowed with an 
initial stock of health at birth, which is partially determined 
by inherited biological characteristics. Given the random 
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distribution of biological characteristics in a cohort of births, 
it is assumed that the level of this initial stock of health 
bears little on the variability of health status betlveen 
socioeconomic groups and their changes over time. 
The· initial stock of health is continuously increased by the 
household's engagement in health~promoting activities on the one 
hand. Families engage in new investment in health by purchasing 
medical goods (M) andjor using traditional medical inputs (X) 
based on the knowledge, Ku they have accumulated on health 
technologies by time t. on the other hand, the individual's 
exposure to diseases prevalent in his/her community deteriorates 
that individual's capacity to combat disease. The former 
component of changes in health stock can be viewed as gross-
investment in a person's health; the latter, as the use-intensity 
of the child's health. In summary, over some period of time, the 
change in an individual's health status, [H(t)], can be viewed as 
the outcome of the investment (I) in and depreciation (d) of 
health stock. This is expressed verbally in equation (3a) and 

































gross investment in health 
purchased modern medical goods or 
services at time t 
purchased traditional medical inputs at 
time t 
knowledge about health technologies at 
time t 
rate of depreciation of health stock 
vector of physical environmental 
variables describing the community where 
the individual lives 
marginal productivities of modern and 
traditional medical inputs, respectively 
Iu I 2 > 0. 
As with other commodities produced within the household, the 
level of health that a family can attain is constrained by its 
financial and nonfinancial resources and its economic 
environment. The family's wealth, W,, is assumed to change over 
time according to equation (4). 
(4) W, = rOWP + Y(t) 




















real interest rate 
1 + s, degree of subsidy 
subsidy rate 
consumer purchase price of unearned wealth 
(e.g. assets) 
Owv = actual market value of unearned wealth 
annual value of actual unearned wealth 
earned income at time t 
composite consumption good 
the price of c(t) 
modern medical inputs 
monetary price of M(t) 
lost income associated with purchase of M(t) 
traditional medical inputs 
monetary price of X(t) 
lost income associated with use of X; 
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Family wealth includes both earned (Y) and unearned (1~,) 
income. In the presence of government subsidies, the actual 
market value of unearned income may be more than the purchase 
price paid by the family for the particular asset, (l~p). The 
ratio of the market value to the purchase value of unearned 
wealth, (W.fi~P), indicates the degree of government subsidy (li) on 
unearned ~vealth2 • This rate depends on a multitude of factors 
such as those described in the previous section: exposure to 
public community environment programs, dependence of subsistence 
farming, degree of integration into the market economy, age, sex, 
ethnic group. Government policy determines the amount of the 
subsidy program and the target population. Annually, the income 
from wealth depends on the real interest rate, (r). 
This representation of wealth allows one to explicitly 
consider several aspects of government subsidization on health 
status. First, family wealth is derived from both the purchase 
price and the subsidized portion of wealth, (rli=r+rs) . Second, 
expenditures are specified to include the cash and time costs of 
seeking medical care which are included in most health care 
demand models (Acton, 1975i Akin et. al., 198lj Heller, 1982). 
Public policy may directly affect the price of medical care. 
Third, public policy may affect earned income through wage 
controls or other employment policies such as food for work 
programs. The wealth constraint can be much more elaborately 
specified to capture all the ways in which fiscal policies affect 
household income. The specification chosen is deemed sufficient 
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to demonstrate the concepts behind the social matrix. Moreover, 
a comprehensive specification is likely to be country-specific. 
The objective of the family is to choose a path over time of 
consumption of other goods, C(t), and a path over time of gross 
investment in each family member's health by using modern health 
inputs M(t), and/or traditional ·inputs X(t) in order to maximize 
family welfare. The family faces t\vo constraints: a bio-
technical constraint of health production, as sh01vn in equation 
(3), and a wealth constraint, vlhich is represented in (4). The 
constrained dynamic optimization problem is presented in equation 
( 5) • 
. . 
(5) A = a(t) U{C(t) ,f[H(t)]} + y•(t)H + y• (t) H + yw(t)IV, + yww, 
A = Dynamic versions of Hamiltonian 
yh = costate variable of H(t) 
yw = costate variable of lq, (t) 
It can be solved to understand the effect of government policy on 
health. Assuming that all types of medical inputs are used, the 
necessary conditions which satisfy this dynamic problem are 
presented in equations (6-7). 
= p(t) [ d(t;E) - (rO + 6') ] 
(7a) I 1p(t) 
(7b) I 2p (t) 
= m(t) + FMi 
= x(t) + Fxi 
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uh = marginal utility of healthy days 
fl = ah;aH 
u = marginal utility of Health, discounted 
p (t) = effective marginal cost of nmv health 
investment 
<5' = percent change in marginal cost of nerd 
health investment, p (t) 
d(tjE) = depreciation of health stock re +<5' = cost oLv/ealth (with subsidized portion) 
The first condition presented in equation (6) identifies the 
optimal health stock lvhich maximizes household lvelfare 1vithin the 
biotechnical and Health constraints. Given this optimal health 
stock, the second condition (7a-7b) determines the cost 
minimizing combinations of types of medical inputs to produce it. 
The interpretation of equation (6) is that the marginal benefits 
of health, Uhf11 standardized by the marginal benefits of lvealth, 
u, are equal to the user cost of health capital, d(tjE) 
standardized by the marginal costs of 1•/eal th, (r8 + <5') • 
Equations (7a) and (7b) represent the typical cost minimization 
conditionsj the household chooses a combination of inputs where 
the marginal value product of an input equals its marginal cost. 
(c) The Social Matrix 
With this frameHork, the linkages between equity and . 
efficiency become clearer. Through government policies affecting 
full income, the equity structure of the fiscal system can 
influence the efficiency with which health-related inputs are 
combined by changing their marginal costs and marginal benefits, 
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resulting in different levels of health status. As shown in 
Table 1, government policy operates through the social matrix in 
primarily four vrays. First, for households living in communities 
where public expenditure are allocated to ameliorate community 
environm.ental conditions, depreciation costs of health status 
will be affected. Second, for households with access to 
subsidized prices, primarily of health-related inputs, the 
marginal cost of improving the health stock will change through 
the price variable, p(t). Third, households with access to 
subsidized family unearned income, such as housing, will have a 
different marginal cost of maintaining health status as shovm by 
the change in the user cost of health capital. Finally, 
households with access to subsidies on earned income will be 
affected through changes in the marginal utility of market value 
of wealth, W,. Notably, the first three types of government 
policy changes (public expenditures on environment, public 
expenditures on medical inputs, subsidies on unearned wealth 
l·lhich are not health-related) affect the user cost of health 
capital. The latter government policy (changes in earned income) 
affects the marginal benefits of health stock. The effect of 
each type of government policy on health is demonstrated below. 
(Insert Table 1 here] 
To illustrate how inequalities in health develop among 
socioeconomic groups and how the inequalities may change during 
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economic crises and structural adjustment, equation (6) is 
represented graphically, as shovm in figure 1. The marginal 
benefits (MB) curve represents the right-hand side of the 
equality in (6) . The slope of l1B is based on the assumption 
that, as an individual becomes healthier, the marginal benefit 
from increasing his or her health gets smaller. The marginal 
cost (MC) curve represents the left-hand side of the equality in 
(6). The constant slope of the marginal costs (l1C) curve is 
based on the simplifying assumption that increases in the costs 
of health-promoting activities are independent of the level of 
health stock. The relative positions of the l1B and MC curves 
summarize the environment of the family, and H* indicates the 
level of health the individual can achieve in this environment. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
(i) Public expenditures on community environmental conditions 
Using figure 1, assume that Type I and Type II families have 
similar characteristics except that Type I families reside in an 
area with adequate community-level public health programs, while 
Type II families do not. Type II families face greater exposure 
to environmental contamination, thus their depreciation costs are 
higher. Moreover, they face higher effective marginal cost of 
new health investment, p(t) because the price of access to modern 
medical care is likely to be higher. 3 Type II families will 
achieve a lower level of health, Hrr* 1 than Type I families, H1* 1 
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other things being equal. If structural adjustment reduces 
public expenditures for these public health programs 1 then the 
health stock of Type I families will deteriorate; the health 
status of Type II families will remain unchanged. 
(ii) Public subsidies for prices of health inputs 
In this case 1 also using figure 1 1 assume that Type I and 
Type II families have similar characteristics except that Type I 
families reside in an area with available and accessible modern 
public health services 1 while Type II families do not. Type II 
families will have to pay more to obtain modern medical care; 
therefore 1 they will not be able to achieve the same health 
status as Type I families. If public support of modern health 
care services is removed 1 the health status of Type I families 
will deteriorate. 
(iii) Subsidized unearned income, non-health-related 
In this case 1 Type I families reside in an urban area where 
housing is heavily subsidized. In figure 1 1 we see that the 
Type I families face a lower marginal cost of health stock and 
are able to achieve higher health status. If structural 
adjustment removes these subsidies 1 then the health status of 
Type I families will deteriorate; the health status of Type II 
families will remain unchanged. A critical point is that the 
size of the shift in the marginal cost curve of Type I families 
depends directly on the degree of subsidy. 
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(iv) Subsidized earned income, non-health-related 
Government policies may also include wage controls and other 
forms of earned income subsidies. As sh01vn in equation (6), the 
effect on health is determined through the marginal utility of 
actual wealth valued at market value. The MB rather than the MC 
curve will be affected. The effects of family \•/ealth on health 
are illustrated in figure 2. As family wealth increases, the 
marginal utility of wealth decreases and resources allocated to 
health increase, yielding a higher level of health. Changes in 
current income, as a component of wealth, shift the MB curve from 
MBrr to MB1 ; but these shifts may be limited for families with 
substantial savings or for families facing mild borrowing 
constraints. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
4.0 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
During the past decade, various studies have attempted to 
examine the consequences of macroeconomic adjustments to health 
and nutritional status. Two studies, one of the Cote d'·Ivoire 
and the other of the Sudan, suggest the importance of applying 
the social matrix framework in order to understand the 
relationships between changes in fiscal policy, health and health 
care utilization (Eltigani, 1989; Diop, 1990; Diop, Hill and 
Sirageldin, 1991; and Sirageldin and Diop, 1991). In the rest of 
this section, we briefly discuss these findings. Complete 
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variable specifications and empirical results for these studies 
are provided in an annex. 
(a) The Case of the Cote d'Ivoire 
During the 1970s, the Ivorian economy grew tremendously as a 
result of a dynamic agricultural·. sector and favorable 
international markets and rapidly growing manufacturing and 
service sectors (den Tuinder, 1978; and Zartman and Delgado, 
1984). Confidence in the economies future performance that the 
cocoa and coffee boom generated led to an explosion in government 
spending and increased borrowing in international financial 
markets at relatively hard terms. However, between 1980 and 1986, 
the Ivorian economy suffered a severe economic crisis, and with 
the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, the authorities undertook a structural adjustment program 
(SAP) in an effort to adjust the country's macroeconomic 
imbalances (Lambert, Schneider, Sm1a, 1991). 
Public investment suffered severe cutbacks in the Ivory 
Coast between 1980 and 1986. The extent to which such cutbacks 
affected the health sector, h01vever, is unclear. At the end of 
the period, primary health care investment accounted for less 
than 5 percent of total public health investment (Grootaert and 
Kanbur, 1990). There was no significant reallocation of public 
health resources during the period: hospital centers in Abidjan 
were still absorbing the bulk of public investment in health. 
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The economic crisis and adjustment policies seem to have 
affected mainly the urban families. civil servants in Ivory 
coast experienced severe cutbacks in real income during the first 
half of the 1980s. The Ivorian SAP introduced changes in urban 
housing policy, shifting the emphasis from the "high-standard 
housing" approach of the 1970s, vihich disproportionately 
benefitted upper income classes, toward site development targeted 
to lower income families. It is not clear how the adjustment 
process affected the incomes of families engaged in the urban 
informal sector. In the rural areas, hoi·Tever, agricultural 
policy components of the SAP have eventually protected the 
incomes of families self-employed in cash crop production. 
The analysis for the Ivory Coast is based on the Living 
standards Measurement surveys (LSMS) conducted in the Ivory Coast 
in 1985 and 1986. The focus of the Ivory Coast study is on 
infant and child mortality. The probability of dying in the 
first year of life is used as an indicator of child health. The 
age-dependent nature of child-health-promoting activities and the 
effect of environmental contamination on child health suggests a 
conditional analysis based on intervals shorter than the first-
year range. Consequently, two analyses are performed, one for 
the dependent variable: probability of neonatal death; and the 
second for the dependent variable: probability of postneonatal 
death. 
Regression analyses are used to assess the changes in child 
health betlveen 1970 and 1986. The analyses focus on how these 
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changes vary among socioeconomic groups. Maximum likelihood 
methods \·rere used to fit t•.vo logistic models -- a neonatal 
mortality model and a postneonatal mortality model -- to the 
data. Theses indicators of health status are estimated as a 
function of (a) the time of birth either in the period of 
prosperity, 1977-1981, or the period of economic crisis, 1982-
1986i (b) whether the birth is first order or seventh order and 
higheri (c) the sex of childi (d) whether the mother's age' at 
birth is younger that 20 years or more than 35 yearsi (e) 
socioeconomic status: urban poor, urban nonpoor, rural poori (f) 
level of savingsi and (g) mother's education. 
Family expenditure per capita is an indicator of family 
permanent incomei it is used to classify families by income 
group. Family expenditure per capita is also used to define the 
rural poor and the urban poor. The rural poor is defined as 
families who fall within the bottom 60 percent of the 
distribution of family income within the rural areas. The urban 
poor is similarly defined using the distribution of family income 
in the urban areas. The ratio of the total amount of family 
savings over total family expenditure is used as an indicator of 
the availability to the family of a buffer mechanism for 
mitigating the effects of changes in the family's economic 
environment on investment in child health. Price variables were 
not available, so dummy variables indicating the expansionary 
period (1977-1981) and the economic crisis-adjustment period 
(1982-1986) are used to capture changes in the economic 
environment of families between these two periods. The analysis 
is controlled for the effects of demographic variables (birth 
order, sex, mother's age at birth) and parent's education. 
The inferential empirical approach focuses on the effects of 
the interaction of time variables with family socioeconomic 
characteristics (urban poor, urban nonpoor, rural poor and level 
of savings) on the likelihood of neonatal death and of 
postneonatal death between 1970 and 1986. For a given 
socioeconomic group, the deterioration of its child investment 
environment during the economic crisis adjustment period is 
expected to be reflected in the results by positive parameter 
estimates of the interaction of the variable indicating that the 
birth occurred during the crisis with the respective 
socioeconomic variable. 
Interaction terms do not add significantly to the 
explanatory power of the neonatal mortality model. In contrast, 
they improve the fit of the postneonatal mortality model. The 
data support the finding that children of urban nonpoor families 
born during the economic crisis adjustment period experienced 
significantly higher postneonatal mortality than their 
counterparts, other things being equal. Similarly, children born 
to families with virtually no savings experienced heavier 
postneonatal mortality after controlling for other variables. 
These results are consistent with patterns suggested in the 
conceptual framework. 
22 
The occurrence of neonatal death or postneonatal death is 
negatively correlated with being born among the rural poor 
betvreen 1.982 and 1.986, after controlling for the effects of other 
variables. These results, though \veak, signal improvements in 
child health among the rural poor during the adjustment period. 
(b) The Case of Sudan 
The Sudan study demonstrates the application of the social 
matrix from a different perspective. A cross-sectional analysis 
identifies those groups who are heavily dependent on public 
immunization programs and those \·Tho appear to be excluded from 
such services. The objective of the study is to explain 
utilization of health care services for-children (0-4 yrs) by the 
level of mother's education and other socio-economic 
characteristics of mothers and households in Gezira, Sudan. The 
results show that despite the predicted importance of mother's 
education on child health, there are equally, if not more, 
important variables influencing child health and demand for 
health services. As we will see, some of these findings can be 
explained by the social matrix. 
Gezira is the area of land that lies bet\Veen the Blue and 
White Niles south of Khartoum, the country's capital. 
Specifically, it is that part of the country ~Vhich is irrigated 
and primarily used for cotton production, the major export of the 
country. Gezira enjoys a favorable allocation of health services 
compared to the rest of the country. Priority has traditionally 
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given to curative services. HoHever, in this area, massive 
periodic immunization campaigns accompanied by advertising 
efforts started during the early 1980s. During 1985 it was 
estimated that immunization coverage in the Gezira region 
increased from 18% in 1980 to 30% in 1985. 
The data for the study comes·· from the survey "Socio-economic 
Aspects of Child Health in Gezira" conducted during the period 
November 1986 through February 1987. A sample of 1,241 
households from 31 villages and labor camps in Gezira and Managil 
Extension >vere surveyed. 
The multivariate analysis tested whether the rate of child 
immunization depends on mother's education level, father's 
education, mother's economic activity, father's occupation,. 
whether the family are migrants or native to the area, and the 
availability of health services in the village, the household 
assets, and whether the household is located in Block 27 (an area 
that is covered by the Blue Nile Health project activities) . 
Of particular interest here is the variable pertaining to 
migrant status. It was expected that children of migrant 
households would experience lower rates of immunization compared 
to their non-migrant counterparts because the majority of the 
migrants live in labor camps that are not covered by any form of 
health services and are likely not to be covered by immunization 
campaigns. Using our definitions of the social matrix, migrants 
would not be classified as fiscally vulnerable. Without access 
to public immunization services, their health is not threatened 
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by the removal of public services. An indication of non-fiscal 
vulnerability would be a significant and negative coefficient on 
the migrant variable, showing that migrants are generally 
excluded from public health care service. 
Only five variables are significant including mother's 
education, mother's work activity, migrant status of the 
household, occupation of the father, and the location of the 
household. The migrant status of .the household negatively 
influenced the completeness of child immunization and this impact 
is significant. The public immunization programs appear not to 
reach these households, even under relatively good economic 
conditions. In contrast, the evidence suggests that native 
households are heavily dependent on public immunizations, making 
them vulnerable to any decrease in public subsidization of these 
programs. Should fiscal support of health services fall, we 
would expect the non-migrant population to suffer the most. The 
migrant population never benefitted from these services to begin 
with. 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
Many countries starting from the late l970's had to adjust 
to severe macro economic imbalances. These circumstances and 
adjustments created a concern as to the impact of accompanying 
changes in fiscal policy on past and future gains in health 
status in developing countries. Some have suggested that if 
national health status indicators are unaffected by reductions in 
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public subsidies for health, it is because public health services 
vTere ineffective and inefficient to begin with, or that 
households compensated for reduced public services by shifting to 
private health providers. Although these explanations may be 
valid, such generalizations should not be made \·Tithout first 
examining the distributional impacts of changes in the public 
subsidy system. To do this, a framework for identifying and 
assessing the health status of those dependent on the public 
subsidy system is required. l'le have proposed that household 
responses to changes in public policy can best be elucidated for 
a given society \'Then the "social matrix" underlying the structure 
of the fiscal system is adequately specified. As a basis for the 
social matrix, vTe recognize that government policy affects the 
availability and distribution of the proximate determinants 
necessary for the production of health. This means that the 
equity structure of the fiscal system can influence the 
efficiency with which health-related inputs are combined. The 
social matrix highlights a particular aspect of equity, namely, 
"fiscal vulnerability". The fiscally vulnerable are those who 
experience a fall in living standards (full income) as a result 
of a secular decrease in public expenditure. 
A simplified model of household behavior is used to explain 
the relationships between fiscal vulnerability and efficiency in 
the social matrix. Using this model, four examples of changes in 
fiscal policy are presented to demonstrate the use of the social 
matrix in explaining the potential impacts of structural 
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adjustment programs on health. First, to the extent that 
changes in public expenditure for health have an impact on 
environmental contamination, depreciation costs of the health 
stock will change. Second, changes in public expenditure for 
health may affect the prices of medical and other health care 
inputs. Third, changes in non-health-related government 
subsidies, such as housing, affect health through the user cost 
of health capital; the degree of subsidies on unearned wealth is 
changed. Finally, government policies l·rhich affect earned income 
have an impact on the marginal utility of market value of wealth. 
Notably, the first three types of government policy changes 
affect the user cost of health capital. The latter affects the 
marginal benefits of health stock. 
Evidence from two sub-Saharan African countries, the Cote 
d'Ivoire and the Sudan is explained in terms of the social matrix 
and fiscal vulnerability. In the Ivory Coast, the stabilization 
policies, together with economic crisis in the Ivory Coast, have 
lead to a decline in real income in urban areas. In contrast, 
rural incomes among producers of cash crops may not have been 
negatively affected, because agricultural policy components of 
the SAP have been relatively protective of agricultural incomes. 
As subsidies to urban consumers have been curtailed, and real 
income in these settings has been declining, child health in the 
urban areas has deteriorated, particularly in the postneonatal 
period. This deterioration has disproportionately affected 
families in the top 40 percent of urban income distribution, 
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mostly civil servants. In the rural areas child health has not 
been significantly affected by the economic crisis or adjustment 
policies. This finding is consistent >·lith the notion that when 
families are insulated from (or marginally affected by) public 
services· and subsidies, they will be insulated also from changes 
in these services and subsidies during an adjustment process. 
In the case of the sudan, empirical evidence demonstrates 
the notion of fiscal vulnerability by identifying those groups 
(native households) >vhich are dependent on publicly supported 
immunization programs. In contrast, other groups (migrants) 
appear not have access to these programs. The implication is 
that should fiscal support of immunization campaigns fall, the 
health status of native households are iikely to suffer most 
because public programs never reached migrant groups to begin 
>Vith. 
A major recommendation coming from our approach is that 
improved data collection and analysis of real income effects is 
essential. Those >Vho benefit from the secular increase in public 
expenditure, a result of being in favor follo>Ving shifts in 
political regimes (as in Chile, Nigeria or Ghana) are not 
necessarily the poor or deprived in the statistical description 
of income data. They are what we label as "fiscally vulnerable." 
It is this type of data on the share of government income and 
price subsidies in household resources that are needed for the 
construction of the Social Matrix, in order to analyze the effect 
of changes in public expenditure on household's reallocation of 
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their reduced real resources among the various basic commodities 
including their health status. 
\'le believe that such analyses could be greatly enhanced lvith 
a deeper understanding of the political economy of governments, 
especially the determinants of the level, composition and 
distribution of its expenditures···and consumption. Given the 
political sensitivity of such issues, analyses along these lines 
can help policy analysts and decision-makers evaluate issues and 
options, but ultimately, recipient countries must make their own 
fundamental value choices, a position which is increasingly 
recognized by major donors (Elmendorf and Lamboray, l99l). 
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ENDNOTES 
1. In the absence of other changes, reduced government spending 
can be expected to slO\v the expansion of the provision of safe 
drinking water and to reduce the safety of piped ,.,ater. Both 
effects '"ill be stronger in urban than in rural areas, '"here piped 
vlater is rare. Another example deals '"ith reduced government 
expenditure for the provision of affordable housing, '"hile cost 
recovery increases rental payments. This is likely to increase 
cro'"ding in urban areas and such crowding will increase 
transmission rates for airborne infectious diseases. 
2. For example, if an individual purchased a house under a housing 
subsidy program, (W•) would capture what he/she paid for the housing 
(e.g. $9, 000) , (W,) v/Ould represent the market value of the housing 
(e.g.$10,000), (8) represents the degree of subsidy, (e.g. 1.11), 
(s) is the subsidy rate (e.g. 11%). 
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FIGURE 1: DIFFERENCES IN CHILD HEALTH BETWEEN TWO SOCIOECONOMIC 




FIGURE 2: DIFFERENCES IN CHILD HEALTH BET'v'IEEN TWO INCOME 







Table A-1: Cote d'Ivoire- Variables 
Variable Variable labels and values Unit 
Do Neonatal death Birth 
-1 if death in the first month of life, 
0 otherwise. 
sl Exposed to post neonatal death Birth 
-1 if survival up to the first month of 
life and born 1 year before the survey, 
0 otherwise. 
Dt Postneonatal death Birth 
-1 if death between the first and the 12th months of life, 
0 otherwise. 
Time 2 Born between 1977 and 1981 Birth 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Time 3 Born between 1982 and 1986 Birth 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Ordl First in birth order Birth 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise 
Ord2 Birth order is 7th or higher Birth 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Male Sex of child is male Birth 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Mageb1 Mother's age at birth is Birth 
below 20 years, 
0 otherwise 
Mageb2 Mother's age at birth is Birth 
35 years or more 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise 
Table A-1: Continued 
Variable Variable labels and values Unit 
Urbani Urban poor Household 
-1 if yes 
0 otherwise. 
Urban2 Urban nonpoor Household 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Rurall Rural poor Household 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Savingsl Ratio of savings over family expenditure Household 
is less than 1 percent 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Savingsl Ratio of savings over family expenditure Household 
is between 1 and 5 percent 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Meduc2 Mother's education is primary Mother 
-1 if yes, 
0 if otherwise. 
Meduc3 Mother's education is secondary or above Mother 
-1 if yes, 
0 otherwise. 
Source: Diop 1990 
Table A-2: Cote d'Ivoire- Results 
Neonatal Mortality Postneonatal Mortality 
Variable Coefficient Chi-square Coefficient Chi-square 
Intercept -3.39226 152.27 * -2.80905 109.66* 
Time2 0.15771 0.19 -0.28819 0.59 
Time3 -0.10228 O.Q7 0.00759 0.00 
Ord1 0.38778 5.68** 0.14689 0.62 
Ord2 0.71340 22.04* 6.54** 
Male 0.14130 1.34 -0.06799 0.25 
Magebl 0.03004 0.04 0.17842 1.28 
Mageb2 -0.09816 0.16 -0.16455 0.32 
Urban1 -0.49365 2.31 -0.31418 1.12 
Urban2 -0.01402 0.00 -1.13590 4.37** 
Rurall 0.39930 2.76*** -0.19990 0.60 
Savings! 0.20246 0.70 -0.12521 0.24 
Savings2 0.19392 0.66 -0.32094 1.42 
Meduc2 0.22020 0.73 -0.45176 1.61 
Meduc3 -0.18936 0.21 -1.07151 3.11 *** 
Time2 *U rbanl 0.07393 0.03 -0.45794 0.89 
Time2*Urban2 -0.28729 0.30 0.65811 0.83 
Time2*Rural2 -0.44130 1.53 0.35481 0.84 
Time3*Urban1 0.32111 0.44 -0.46590 0.96 
Time3 *U rban2 0.17022 0.10 1.26450 3.69*** 
Time3*Rural1 -0.19119 0.24 -0.47631 1.29 
Time2*Savings1 0.23976 0.46 0.35849 0.88 
Time2 *Savings2 -0.08854 0.06 0.21924 0.30 
Time3 *Savings 1 0.06511 0.03 0.91607 5.43** 
Time3*Savings2 0.18999 0.27 0.23648 0.29 
Model Chi-square 49.73* 53.02* 
Degrees of freedom 24 24 
Number of observations 5,354 4,801 
Table A-2 Continued 
Note: A Chi-square (df-1) associated with a coefficient's estimate is the square of the ratio of 
the estimate over its asymptotic standard error. 
Significance level:*, < .01; **, [ .01, .05); ***, [.05, .10). 
Dependent Variable- Pr CDo -1). <neonatal mortality model> 
Dependent Variable- Pr (D1 1 S1-l) <postneonatal mortality model> 






























Source: Eltigani, 1989 
Explanation 
dummy variable = 1 if child completed immunization, zero otherwise 
illiterate (reference group) 
not complete primary 
primary and over 
illiterate (reference group) 
not complete primary 
primary and over 
dummy = 1 if mother is working, zero otherwise 
dummy = 1 if head of household is a migrant, zero otherwise 
dummy = 1 if father is tenant (reference group) 
dummy = 1 if father is farm worker 
dummy = 1 if father is other worker 
dummy = 1 if father is white collar 
dummy = 1 if father is merchant or own/account 
dummy = 1 if child is male, zero otherwise 
dummy = 1 if village has at least dressing station 
Aggregate of the number of assets owned by the household 
dummy = 1 if the household is located in Block 27, zero otherwise 
,, ,, I 
Table A-4 
Multiple Logistic Regression Results of Child Immunization Completeness on Selected 


































model chi -square 85.81 ** 
number of observations = 1017 
**p< .05 
Chi-square 
5.01 
1.55 
3.75** 
0.38 
1.99 
5.49** 
3.98** 
0.25 
2.22 
4.87** 
0.08 
0.02 
1.41 
1.56 
12.30 
